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"The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him, and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust."
Henry Stimson, Secretary of War (1945)
SPSE Speaks Out on Polygraphs August 13, 1999
Workers at the national laboratories have come under suspicion of having leaked nuclear secrets to the Chinese. Two congressional committees have alleged that these leaks have occurred at the laboratories for over two decades. As a result, unprecedented security measures, including polygraph testing, are being proposed for implementation at our place of work.
Several former Lab directors, Edward Teller, John Foster, Michael May of LLNL, as well as Harold Agnew of LANL--all world experts on nuclear weapons issues--have voiced skepticism of the allegations in the Cox Report, and have warned of an over-reaction on security. SPSE shares their sentiments, not being aware of any lab employees who possess evidence regarding the alleged security leaks at the DOE labs. In addition, no charges of espionage have been filed against Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwanese-American computer scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, who was fired in March 1999. He has admitted to moving classified computer codes to an unclassified computer system. This is certainly a serious security violation, but by itself does not prove that he is a spy.
In view of the security violations committed by Wen Ho Lee, the recent efforts by the Department of Energy to tighten security and to raise our security awareness have, for the most part, been justified. SPSE fully supports effective security measures, including the cyber security measures that make it impossible to download classified data onto unclassified media in the privacy of one's office.
As an organization that upholds and defends employee rights, SPSE cannot, however, support the proposed implementation of polygraph testing for laboratory employees. SPSE's concerns range from the question of how polygraph testing will be implemented, to the threat to employee rights due to the known margin of error associated with polygraph testing.
What are the ramifications if we refuse the test, or if we fail one or more test questions? The lack of any answers to these questions is particularly troubling in view of the probability of "false positives" associated with polygraphs. Their unreliability renders polygraphs incapable of catching spies and can lead to false accusations of innocent workers who may find themselves defenseless against the machine's oscillations.
It is well-known that CIA-spy Aldrich Ames underwent a polygraph test and passed. LANL employee Wen Ho Lee passed one test in December 1998 and failed one in February 1999. Despite two polygraph tests, it is still not known conclusively whether Lee is innocent or guilty. These examples, and many others, explain why prosecutors don't rely on polygraphs, why courts do not admit them, and why even the Senate Intelligence Committee has asked the FBI and CIA to explore alternatives.
Whether the reliability of polygraphs is 61% (according to a 1997 study of the American Psychological Association), or as high as 99.9% (according to the promoters of polygraph testing) is really immaterial. If thousands of workers are tested, as DOE proposes, some will surely be falsely accused of lying, with devastating effects on their careers. This scenario brings back memories of the 1950's when Senator Joseph R. McCarthy created a national hysteria. Many good and decent people were personally damaged and humiliated by unfounded accusations. This was America at its worst, and we do not need another witch hunt.
To test thousands of workers--not to mention the many lawsuits that will arise--will be a very expensive way to create nothing more than an illusion of security. During the McCarthy era, any real enemy agent would undoubtedly have rushed to sign a loyalty oath. Similarly, today's enemy agents will be busy learning how to beat the machine before volunteering for polygraph testing.
Already some highly talented lab employees have decided to leave in protest of imminent polygraph tests and a growing atmosphere of distrust. Once the policy is in place, the problem of recruiting and retaining highly qualified workers will only get worse, as they see their career dependent on an unreliable machine. Polygraph testing, combined with severe restrictions on collaborations with "foreign nationals," will cause research at the national laboratories to deteriorate drastically. Nuclear secrets depend on basic scientific research, and such research thrives in an intellectually open and academic environment. It is doomed at a place where everybody is a suspect, and where management puts more trust in the polygraph machine than in its workforce. Paradoxically, the same politicians who clamor the loudest about America losing its nuclear secrets due to espionage, will, by their over-reaction, weaken the very centers where these secrets originate.
SPSE feels that the introduction
of polygraphs to the national laboratories raises many more problems
than it solves. Polygraphs will not increase security, but instead
will lead to intimidation and resentment of the laboratories'
workforce. Consequently, SPSE urges Congress and Secretary Richardson
to reconsider the decision to bring polygraph testing to the national
laboratories. Instead, we encourage them to open a dialogue with
the laboratory workers themselves as to how security could be
improved.
[Read what other people have to say about the proposed polygraph testing.]
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